הזבל של בעל הבית ב"מ ק"ב

The Gra points out that there is a fundamental machlokes harishonim about a rented חצר. Rashi, Tosafos, Ritva and others hold that if you rent a חצר you, the renter is קונה with the חצר. The Rambam on the other hand (quoted in שו"ע סי' שי"ג) holds that the משכיר is קונה. The Rambam is difficult based on the Gemara on י"א by ר"ג. The Gemara says that ר"ג was מקנה to ר' יהושע with a קנין חצר by renting out the place where the grain was. We see clearly that the שוכר is קונה with a קנין חצר. The acharonim on the shulchan aruch give various answers עיי"ש.

This is also relevant to pshat in the Gemara. According to Rashi you have to say that בחצר דאגר ליה לשוכר ותורי דשוכר is either or because since the שוכר is קונה if he rented the חצר then why would it need to be his animals? On the other hand according to the Rambam you may need both.

The רישא of the Mishna according to Rabba Bar R' Huna (Bava Metzia 100a)

As was pointed out yesterday, if the רישא of the mishna is ברי וברי why is the din יחלוקו even according to סומכוס there should be a שבועה of מודה במקצת?

The שיטה quotes the ראב"ד who answers as follows. He says that the case of the Mishna is where the לוקח was תופס the cow or שפחה. Therefore the whole dispute is only on the ולד and there is no מודה במקצת. This very similar to saying הילך however, here it is לכ"ע as he actually was תופס already.

תנא אמר הלה זייתי אני נוטל אין שומעיו לו- ב"מ ק"א

What about if the owner of the field doesn't want the olive trees in his field? Can he force the tree owner to uproot them? Or do we say he can't because of ישוב א"י? The Ritva writes that the owner of the field can force the owner of the trees to uproot them even in ארץ ישראל and this is brought down להלכה in שו"ע ח"מ סי' קס"ח. However, the Acharonim point out that this is really a machlokes the Rambam and the Raavad (הל' גזילה י,ה). The Rambam writes:

היורד לתוך שדה חברו שלא ברשות, ונטעה--אם הייתה שדה העשויה ליטע--אומדין כמה אדם רוצה ליתן בשדה זו ליטעה, ונוטל מבעל השדה; ואם אינה עשויה ליטע--שמין לו, וידו על התחתונה.
אמר לו בעל השדה, עקור אילנך ולך--שומעין לו

The Rambam writes that the owner of the field can force him to remove the trees. The Raavad there is משיג that this is in חו"ל but in א"י he is not allowed to uproot them because of ישוב א"י.

96b meisa machmas melacha vs. regular oness

What is the basis for the chiluk between meisa machmas melacha and a regular oness where even the animal dropping dead from a heart attack would be mechayev you?
Ramban calls it peshiya of the mashil -- that the mashil did not verify that the animal is up to the task he is lending it for. Rashba says, since "לאו לאוקמה בכילתא שאילתא" and he realizes that the animal will have wear and tear from the work and yet he does not set up an evaluation of the animal's worth, it shows he is not makpid. And once he is not makpid on כחש, he is not makpid on death either מחמת מלאכה, because of the idea of מה לי קטלה כולה מה לי קטלה פלגא

be'alav imo for city employees

Rav Meir explained today that according to rashi the teacher and barber are considered be'alav imo when they do melacha for you even though you are not paying them since they collect their salary from the city. In the previous lines, we were not paying the guy to give us a drink of water, so why is this a chiddush?
First of all, we see that Rishonim attack Rashi for his peshat and Ramban and others explain that the case is that these workers, since they are collecting their salary from all the inhabitants of the city, they are considered be'alav imo for everyone at all times, even when he is not teaching your son.
The shita suggests that the Ramban's peshat works in the words of Rashi as well.
Another possibility may be not to focus on the money but to say that the worker is not really working for you -- he works for the city and that is the chiddush.

בעל בנכסי אשתו (Bava Metzia 96a)

The Gemara has a question what is the status of the בעל with respect to the נכסי מלוג. What about the reverse? What is the status of the wife when she uses the husbands property?

The Ramabm (אישות כ"א:ט) writes:

האישה ששברה כלים, בעת שעושה מלאכותיה בתוך ביתה--פטורה: ואין זה מן הדין, אלא תקנה, שאם אין אתה אומר כן, אין שלום בתוך הבית לעולם--אלא נמצאת נזהרת ונמנעת מרוב המלאכות, ונמצאת קטטה ביניהם.

The ראב"ד there is משיג that the פטור is because of שאילה בבעלים. The ראב"ד seems to assume that just like the Gemara says that the husband with respect to the wifes property would be שאילה בבעלים (except that למסקנה he is a לוקח not a שואל), so too the reverse. The husband is משועבד to the wife and therefore it is always considered שאילה בבעלים. The Rambam would seem to assume that since the husband is not always working for the wife the פטור would not apply in all situations.

פועל משלו הוא אוכל (Bava Metzia 92a)

The Gemara says that the נ"מ is whether or not he can give to his wife and children. The Tur raises the question, what about if he picks it up to eat himself and then decides to give it to his wife or children (even if משמים הוא אוכל)? The Tur has 2 opinions and rejects the opinion that it is permitted. The Gra on Shulchan Aruch says that the 2 opinions are based on a machlokes Rashi and Tosafos. Rashi says "כל זמן דלא מטי לידיה לא זכי ליה". The implication is that once he does pick it up it his to do what he wants with including giving to his wife and kids. Tosafos however, says that he is not זוכה until he is "לועס ואוכל" which means that he cannot give it to his wife and kids.

In truth, Rashi on ד"ה אינו קוצץ) עמוד ב ) seems to say like Tosafos "דאין לפועל קטן זכות אלא שנותן לתוך פיו"

Also, in truth, Tosafos is a bit of a פלא, why should he only be זוכה when he puts it in his mouth? Why should this be different then any other מתנות עניים?

אתנן אסרה תורה (Bava Metzia 91a)

The way we have the גירסא the מסקנה is that there is no חיוב that ב"ד can impose because of קם ליה בדרבה מיניה however there is a חיוב בבא לצאת ידי שמים.

The מאירי in בבא קמא quotes a number of Rishonim who have a different גירסא in the Gemara and come to the opposite conclusion. They learn that both by אתנן and חסימה there is a חיוב to pay that ב"ד can enforce. What happened to קם ליה בדרבה מיניה? They learn that קם ליה בדרבה מיניה does not apply to a התחייבות מדעת. It only applies to a חיוב that is based on an action not a person's דעת. It comes out that according to these Rishonim by חסימה you would not say קם ליה בדרבה מיניה because the renter of the פרה agreed to the חיוב מדעת.

חסמה בקול (Bava Metzia 90b)

The simple understanding of the Gemara is like Rashi that he causes the animal not to eat by his voice by yelling at the animal when it is about to eat.

However, if you look carefully at Tosafos (ד"ה רבי יוחנן), you will see that Tosafos disagrees. Tosafos is bothered by a question that רבי יוחנן himself holds that עקימת שפתיו is not a מעשה by נשבע מימר ומקלל and therefore what is the חילוק here and why should חסימה בקול be חייב? Tosafos answers that here he is causing the animal to be דש with his voice and therefore בדיבוריה קא עביד מעשה. Tosafos learns pshat in חסמה בקול that he muzzled the animal normally and then with his voice caused the animal to be דש. This is very difficult in the words of the Gemara, according to Tosafos the Gemara should have asked דשה בקול. He wasn't חוסם בקול here at all. Tosafos is forced into this pshat because they need his דיבור to actually do something, cause the עבירה to happen. By לא תחסם the עיקר עבירה is the דישה while the animal is muzzled and therefore they had to learn that his דיבור caused the דישה.

when did Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai die?

Yesterday we said in shiur, based on Rashi that R' Elazar's father Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai had already died when they were young guys learning in front of Rashbag and Rav Yehoshua Ben Karcha. The Ben Yehoyada points out that this is difficult, since as we know, and we saw it today in shiur, he spent thirteen years in the cave learning with his father and the Ben Yehoyada insists that this story has to take place when R' Elazar was still young. Therefore he suggests that Rashbi was just not around but he was still alive

Who is עובר לפני עור when lending money בריבית? (Bava Metzia 75b)

The simple understanding of the Gemara is that לפני עור only applies to the מלוה and the לוה and that they are always עובר. Tosafos points out that the ערב and עדים can also be עובר if the loan would not take place without them.

The questions can be asked, why are the מלוה and the לוה always עובר? Let's take the following case. Reuven wants to lend money בריבית. Both Shimon and Levi want to borrow. Reuven decides to lend to Shimon. Why should Shimon be עובר לפני עור, after all, if Shimon didn't borrow the money Levi would have? Why isn't this a classic case of חד עברא דנהר where there is no לפני עור?

The ( משנה למלך (הל' מלוה ולוה ד:ב quotes the פני משה who says exactly this. If there were other borrowers available then there is no לפני עור on the לוה. However the משנה למלך disagrees and says the following סברה.

The only time there is a heter of חד עברא דנהר is when without you, the other person could do the עבירה with no help. In the classic case of נזיר, without you he could go and get the wine himself. Since he can violate the עבירה with no help from a Jew, your helping him does not violate לפני עור. However, by ריבית, the only way the מלוה can violate the עבירה is if a Jew helps him. The מלוה needs a Jewish לוה. Therefore, even if there is another Jewish לוה, since, bottom line, a Jew will be מכשיל him, there is an איסור of לפני עור. The fact that if Shimon won't borrow the money Levi will, is irrelevant, the bottom line is that for him to violate the עבירה he needs the help of a Jew (and מאי נפקא מינא whether it is Shimon or Levi, someone is being מכשיל him)and therefore there is always לפני עור by the לוה.

Is there a general היתר of כיכר? (Bava Metzia 75a)

Rashi understands ר' יהודה אמר שמואל that לוין סתם refers to ככרות and that the חכמים are מתיר in any case. However, the Rambam and the Rif learn that even ככר is only מותר if there is a שער and this is how the Shulchan Aruch paskens. The Rama is מתיר like Rashi that a דבר מועט like a loaf of bread is permitted in any case.

תלמידי חכמים מותרים ללות בריבית (Bava Metzia 75a)

Is it permitted for them to make this arrangement up front (פסיקה)?

The Rambam seems to say no. The Rambam is only מתיר a ת"ח to return more (without any pre-arangement at the time of the loan). The Gra learns that the Rambam is מדקדק from the fact that the Gemara said ללות and not להלוות. The obvious question is the המשך הגמרא. The Gemara brings the story of Shmuel where he seems to be פוםק beforehand that he will borrow 100 and return 120. The Gra explains that the Rambam understood that Shmuel was not being פוסק but rather was just raising the possibility that he might return more because he will not be מקפיד to count. The Shulchan Aruch paskens like the Rambama however, the Rama paskens that it is even מותר to be פוסק beforehand.

shmuel and Rabbi Meir (74a)

Rav Meir explained in shiur today that Shmuel must hold like Rabbi Meir. But if Shmuel's only issue is that it not be מחוסר בידי שמים, why is it not enough to have all the raw materials even if it's not עד שיעשו?

two suggestions:
1. Rav Meir mentioned in shiur that the drying is something that may be considered מחוסר בידי שמים.
2. the Shita quotes the Rivan that if all you have is dirt then it is not considered having ביצים של יוצר. This is also used to explain the end of the sugya with shitas chachamim -- during ימות הגשמים it has not been converted to usable zevel yet so it is like there is no zevel.

צדיק גמור אינו בולע (Bava Metzia 71a)

The Gemara distinguishes between a צדיק and a צדיק גמור with respect to whether or not they can be harmed by a Rasha.

This fits in with the classical view of hashgocha pratis as found in the Rishonim and Acharonim.

Both the Rambam and the Ramban based hashgacha pratis on a person's closeness to hashem. The closer a person is to Hashem the higher the level of their hashgocha.

When the brothers are planning on killing Yosef, Reuven saves him by suggesting throwing him into the pit. The mefarshim ask what did Reuven accomplish, the pit was very dangerous (full of snakes, etc.), even life threatening. The Netziv answers as follows. A person has בחירה חפשית and therefore the brothers could kill Yosef even if he was not supposed to die. However, animals since they have no בחירה חפשית cannot kill someone if he is not supposed to die. However the Netziv qualifies this by saying that this only applies to someone who is not a צדיק גמור, but a צדיק גמור cannot be harmed even through בחירה חפשית, exactly like our Gemara (see also the אלשיך and אור החיים there).

What was Rava's question מאי תשיך לאו תשוך (Bava Metzia 70b)

The Rishonim (Tosafos, Ritva, etc.) ask, ר' נחמן was saying that there is an איסור דרבנן so why should we care that מן התורה you can lend money to a גוי בריבית?

There is a famous Taz in a number of places (יו"ד סי' קי"ז, ח"מ סי' ב', או"ח סי' תקפ"ח) where the Taz claims that חז"ל are not allowed to assur something that the Torah explicitly permits. He is מדייק from the לשון that is used to justify how חז"ל can make גזירות. The גמרא in Sanhedrin (46a) states שבית דין מכין ועונשים שלא מן התורה ולא לעבור על דברי תורה אלא כדי לעשות סיג לתורה. Why does the Gemara say ולא לעבור על דברי תורה? Are Chazal going to make a גזירה to tell us to violate an issur? The Taz says the pshat is that Chazal even when they make a גזירה are not allowed to be עוקר דבר מן התורה and be לעבור על דברי תורה. In other words חז"ל can not make a גזירה to prohibit something that the torah explicitly permits.

Tosafos seems to use this principle to answer our original question. Rava is asking if the Torah explicitly permits us to lend a גוי money בריבית then how can we make an issur d'rabbanan to prohibit it? It is being עוקר something מן התורה.

The Rambam writes מלוה ולוה ה: א-ב :
ומצות עשה להשיך לגוי, שנאמר "לנוכרי תשיך" (דברים כג,כא)--מפי השמועה למדו, שזו מצות עשה; וזה הוא דין תורה.

אסרו חכמים שיהיה ישראל מלווה את הגוי בריבית קצוצה, אלא בכדי חייו. גזרו שמא ילמוד ממעשיו

The Rambam seems to be against the Taz. On one hand the Rambam writes that there is a מצוה דאורייתא to lend money to a גוי בריבית, on the other hand in halacha ב he writes that there is an issur דרבנן to do so. If there is a miztva to lend money בריבית to a גוי how could חז"ל prohibit it according to the Taz?

Some acharonim answer as follows. The Taz himself writes that חז"ל are allowed to make a partial issur on something that is permitted by the Torah. In hilchos Shofar the Taz quotes a question why didn't חז"ל prohibit blowing shofar on Rosh Hashana גזירה maybe you you will fix a musical instrument? He answers with his principal, that they cannot be עוקר a mitzva. However, they were allowed to make a גזירה prohibiting shofar on Shabbos because they were not completely עוקר the mitzva.

Based on this we can answer the Rambam as follows. Since there is a heter to lend a גוי בריבית, namely כדי חייו, they were not עוקר the mitzva completely and therefore they were permitted to do it.

Tosafos writes that nowadays we are allowed to lend money to a גוי בריבית because all our business is with גויים and therefore אין לאסור ריבית שמא ילמוד ממעשיו יותר משאר משא ומתן. This is quoted להלכה in שו"ע. The poskim seem to assume that the reason for the גזירה was שמא ילמוד ממעשיו and this no longer applies today. The obvious question is what happened to the idea that גזירות are לא פלוג and even if the reason no longer applies the gezera still applies?

R' Shachter in his sefer ארץ הצבי says the following. We only say that a גזירה is לא פלוג when the reason for the גזירה is not written into the גזירה, which is most גזירות. However, based on the Taz, in a case where the גזירה is coming to assur something that is explicitly permitted by the Torah, חז"ל were not allowed to make a לא פלוג but rather had to incorporate the reason for the גזירה into the גזירה. Therefore, the גזירה is limited to when the reason applies. By doing this, they are not being עוקר דבר מן התורה because the גזירה only applies in limited circumstances. This is why רבינא says that it is permitted for a תלמיד חכם to lend money בריבית. The whole reason for the גזירה is שמא ילמוד ממעשיו that doesn't apply to a תלמיד חכם. Again we can ask, what about לא פלוג? Generally all גזירות apply to תלמידי חכמים as well. The answer is that ריבית is not a regular גזירה because it is coming to be עוקר דבר מן התורה, rather it is limited to those cases where the reason applies. Based on this, we understand the heter of Tosafos. Since the reason doesn't apply in this specific case the גזירה doesn't apply, rather the גזירה is only limited to cases that fit the reason. Therefore nowadays where the reason doesn't apply it is permitted to lend money to a גוי בריבית.

The ברייתא of ר' נחמיה and ר' אלעזר בן יעקב

Rashi (according to Tosafos and some Rishonim) understands the מסקנה of the gemara that everyone holds like ר' יוחנן and the מחלוקת is if the מלוה did not yet collect and they argue about the nature of the איסור of לא תשימון. The ת"ק holds that it is an independent issur and therefore as soon as you make the loan you are עובר. ר' נחמיה and ר' אלעזר בן יעקב hold that the issur is only חל when the מלוה is גובה the interest. If he rips up the שטר there was no issur.

Tosafos argues that it would be strange for the gemara to make this ברייתא support ר' יוחנן as we had a ברייתא against ר' יוחנן and we answered כתנאי. Therefore they explain that everyone holds like ר' אלעזר and again the מחלוקת is what is the nature of the issur of לא תשימון . Some rishonim understand Rashi like this as well.

It comes out למסקנה that לא תשימון is not a לאו הניתק לעשה because from the fact that the לוה is over the לאו we see that it is not an ענין of חסרון and therefore giving back the money cannot be מתקן the issur. Ripping up the שטר also does not make it ניתק לעשה because tearing up the שטר is not a מצות עשה. What the Gemara means when it says מאי קום עשה לקרוע שטרא is that since there is an action that you can do, namely ripping up the שטר that will cancel the עבירה you can't get מלקות for לא תשימון because לא תשימון is only חל when the מלוה collects the interest.

אמר אחד הרי עלי בעשרים ואחד הבעלים נותנים עשרים ושש

Rashi and most of the Rishonim understand this to mean that once the בעלים express an interest in being פודה we force them to pay extra קרן if someone else bids more even if they don't want to. It comes out that even thought the בעלים only may have wanted to pay 25 we force them to pay up to 30.

The Rambam has a completely different פשט in this Mishna in ערכין. The Rambam (ערכין ח:ה) writes that if the בעלים say 20 and someone else says 21 and the בעלים say nothing (they make no counteroffer), the בעלים get it for 25 (קרן + חומש). The mishna in ערכין is talking about where the בעלים make a counter offer of 21 and a פרוטה. Then they have to pay 26 + a פרוטה. As the Raavad there points out this is very difficult in the לשון of the Mishna and the sugya there. According to the Rambam why would the בעלים make a counteroffer when they can just stand by their original offer and get it for 25?

חומש on פחות משוה פרוטה

Rashi and many of the Rishonim (see for example תוס' ד"ה אין) understand that everyone agrees that there is a חיוב חומש on a פחות משוה פרוטה the question is can you be פודה the מעשר שני if the חומש is less then a שוה פרוטה

אחרונים ask according to the מ"ד who holds that חומש is not מעכב why wouldn't you be able to be פודה if the חומש is less then a פרוטה after all the פדיון is חל even if he doesn't give the חומש at all? In other words, we should say that ר' אסי and ר"ל hold that חומש is מעכב. One answer may be this is like כל הראוי לבילה אין בילה מעכבתו. The חומש is not מעכב if you can give it. However, if it is less then a שוה פרוטה and therefore you can't give it then everyone would agree that it is מעכב.

The Rambam has a different understanding of this Gemara. The Rambam (מעשר שני ה:ד) understands that the מחלוקת is whether there is a חיוב חומש of less then a שוה פרוטה and ר' אסי and ר"ל hold that if the מעשר שני is worth less then 4 פרוטות you don't need to add a חומש. In fact, the מפרשים point out that the Rambam is a בפירוש ירושלמי however the לשוןof the ברייתא is difficult for the Rambam. The ברייתא explicitly mentions that הוא וחומשו even though according to the Rambam he doesn't need to pay the חומש.

What is the דין where based on מקח it is more then 1/6 but based on מעות it is less then 1/6 or vice versa?

Shmuel holds that you can figure 1/6 based on מעות as well, and therefore if the price is 5 and you pay 6 that is אונאה of 1/6.

The Rishonim discuss the following case. The price is 51 and he paid 60. Based on the מקח he has overpaid by 9/51 which is greater then 1/6, however based on the מעות he only overpaid 9/60 which is less then 1/6. The same applies vice versa. If the price is 60 and he pays 51 based on the מקח he underpaid 9/60, less then 1/6, however based on the מעות he underpaid 9/51, which is greater then 1/6. What is the din in these cases? The Rambam paskens that you always go with the מקח and therefore where the price is 60 and he paid 51 the מקח is קיים. The מגיד משנה there asks on the Rambam how could he say that? We pasken like Shmuel that there is אונאה based on מעות also and therefore since based on מעות he underpaid more then 1/6 the מקח should be חוזר. The Ritva brings the שר מקוצי who agrees with the מגיד משנה while the Ritva himself agrees with the Rambam. Tosafos ד"ה שתות also seems to agree with the Rambam.

The ערוך השולחן explains the Rambam (and really the Ritva seems to say this) as follows. If based on the מעות it is 1/6 (e.g the price was 5 and you paid 6) then we can say that this is 1/6 and the מקח is קיים and the one who was cheated gets his money back. Why? Because no one loses. However, in a case where based on the מעות it is more then 1/6 and based on the מקח it is less then 1/6 (or vice versa) we have a contradiction. Based on one the מקח should be cancelled and based on the other the מקח should be קיים. Since we have a contradiction we need to pick 1 צד and since the עיקר according to everyone is price, we go with the price.

It comes out that we have the following anomaly. If the price is 50 and I paid 60 then the מקח is קיים and I just get the extra 10 that I paid back because it is 1/6 based on the מעות. However, if the price is 51 and I paid 60 overpaying by less (only 9) the מקח is completely בטל because based on the מקח I overpaid more then 1/6.

To summarize, the Rambam וסייעתו hold that where it is not exactly 1/6 then you always go with the מקח and Shmuel only said his דין of מעות where it is exactly 1/6. According to the מגיד משנה and others we go with both unless it is exactly 1/6 based on either the מקח or the מעות then the מקח is קיים and the extra money is returned. However, if it is more then 1/6 either based on מקח or based on מעות the מקח is חוזר. Only if based on both מקח and מעות, it is less then 1/6 do we say the מקח is קיים.

46a Rav Ashi's answer

As we saw today, Rav Ashi differs with Ula's answer in that the coin provided by the shulchani is a real matbeia, yet there is no problem of chalipin with tiv'a due to the fact that he has money at home (based on tosfos understanding of the sugya). Acc to Rav Ashi, though, why does the money returned by the purchaser (the guy paying his workers) have to be non minted coins (it seems acc to Rashi that this is not the case)? As we said in shiur, since you are "purchasing" maos for the dinar, why cant we understand that he is paying back with real money as well?

Based on maharsha in an earlier tosfos, perhaps the answer is that this allows us to learn the sugya even acc to man d'amar that אין מטבע נקנה בחליפין
Perhaps, Tosfos is telling us that money for money, even if the money is different amounts would still involve se'a be'sa and would not be considered a sale of money? The language used in tosfos , though, calls this a matbea and not an unminted coin, which seems to not be what Rav Ashi answers.

אמר שמואל לא נטל נטל ממש (Bava Metzia 44a)

Rashi understands that the Gemara's answer is that he is a שואל on the whole barrel and therefore חייב. Most of the other Rishonim (on the Gemara מ"א.) learn a different p'shat that since he wants the רביעית to stay in the barrel because it stays best there, we look at it as if he took the רביעית of wine out and put it back and therefore he was מחסר. In other words it is שליחות יד with a חסרון.

The ראב"ד has a tremendous chiddush here (הל' גזילה ג:י"ב) that if you are שולח יד on only part of the object you are only חייב on that part, (the ריטב"א is מדייק from Rashi here that he holds this way as well). The only time you are חייב for שליחות יד on the whole object is if your כוונא is to steal the whole object. The obvious question is that this is against the Gemara on מ"א: both by הניח מקלו ותרמילו where you are clearly only שולח יד on part of the animal (your כוונא is definitely not to steal the whole animal but to use it and be מחסר a little) and by ר' יעקב בר אבא. You see that if you have כוונא to steal the whole object then you are חייב even without a חסרון according to everyone, yet according to the Raavad this is exactly the case where there is a מח' whether שליחות יד צריכה חסרון or שליחות יד אינה צריכה חסרון. Additionally, if the only time you are חייב for שליחות יד on the whole object is if your כוונא is to steal the whole object, what exactly is the חידוש of שליחות יד? You are a גזלן anyway? This would seem to be why all the other Rishonim argue on the Raavad.

בעי ר' אשי הגביה ארנקי (Bava Metzia 44a)

The Gemara says that Shmuel could even be according to those who hold that שליחות יד צריכה חסרון and this case is different because he wants the רביעית of wine in the barrel so that it stays better. R' Ashi then asks what about ארנקי? The simple understanding of the Gemara is that R' Ashi's whole question is only if שליחות יד צריכה חסרון but if שליחות יד אינה צריכה חסרון then the case of ארנקי is a classic case of שליחות יד (since at the time he is מגביה he has כוונה to be מחסר by taking out a דינר) and he is for sure חייב. In fact, this is the way the Rif, Rosh and Tur pasken. However, the Rambam (הל' גזילה ג:י"ב) even though he paskens that שליחות יד אינה צריכה חסרון brings down the case of R' Ashi as a ספק how to pasken. We see from the Rambam that he held that R' Ashi's question was even if you hold שליחות יד אינה צריכה חסרון. The Acharonim work hard to understand how the Rambam could say this.

(ר' עקיבא אומר כשעת התביעה (בבא מציעא מ"ג

What case is ר' עקיבא talking about? Is ר' עקיבא talking about the same case as ב"ה and ב"ש, namely שבח?

Tosafos says it can't be. Tosafos asks, if ר' עקיבא holds that שינוי קונה then he was קונה the שבח and he should keep it, if he holds that שינוי אינו קונה then he should pay for what grows even after the תביעה. Therefore Tosafos says that ר' עקיבא is talking about where the price of the object goes up. ר' עקיבא holds that even though כל הגזלנים משלמים כשעת הגזילה a שולח יד is different and pays the value of the object כשעת התביעה even if it goes down which is a tremendous chiddush.

The בעל המאור learns that ר' עקיבא is also going on the same case as ב"ה and ב"ש (namely שבח). He explains that ר' עקיבא holds that he doesn't get the קניני גזילה to be קונה the שבח until the time of the תביעה and therefore that is the time that is קובע. In other words, any שבח until the time of the תביעה belongs to the נגזל. This answers Tosafos's objection, ר' עקיבא holds שינוי קונה but only from the time of תביעה because that is when he gets the קניני גזילה.

The Rif says the opposite of the בעל המאור. The Rif says that any שבח that the גזלן takes from the animal is his until the תביעה, after the תביעה the שבח belongs to the נגזל.

(שליחות יד גזלן ושואל שלא מדעת (בבא מציעא מ"א

What is the difference between שליחות יד and גזלן?

Tosafos ד"ה שנטלה writes that if the שומר takes it to steal it he is חייב because the גזילה itself is a חסרון. Why did Tosafos need to say that? Just say that he is a גזלן? We see from Tosafos that a שומר can never become a גזלן because he is an extension of the מפקיד and therefore the חיוב is always from שליחות יד.

Rashi asks what is the difference between שליחות יד and שואל שלא מדעת?

The Baal Hamaor and the Raavad hold that there is no difference, they are interconnected, if שליחות יד doesn't need חסרון then it is the same as a שואל שלא מדעת.

The Tur (סי' רצ"ב ועיי"ש גר"א) answers Rashi's question differently. The Tur says that שליחות יד requires that the use you are going to make of the object will cause a חסרון (based on the Gemara). When a person is שולח יד he is חייב as soon as he is מגביה however a שואל שלא מדעת is not חייב from when he picks it up but rather from when he actually uses it.

Take the following example. Reuven is watching Shimon's barrel. Reuven decides that he is going to use the barrel as a ladder. Using it as a ladder causes no חסרון and therefore he is not considered to be a שולח יד but rather a שואל שלא מדעת. He picks up the barrel and moves it to where he needs the ladder. Then Reuven gets a phone call and doesn't actually use it. In the meantime, an אונס happens and the barrel breaks. According to the Tur, since Reuven is only a שואל שלא מדעת, Reuven is פטור because the אונס occurred before he actually used the object.

The Ramban answers Rashi's question that the difference is that a שואל is defined as someone who gets all the הנאה, however, in a case where he is not getting all the הנאה but the original owner is still getting some of the benefit it cannot be called שאילה and therefore would fall under the category of שליחות יד. Here in our gemara, where he places he stick etc. on the animals back, the original owner is still benefiting from the שמירה and therefore it can't be called שאילה rather it is שליחות יד.

Is the שומר חייב to sell in a case where there is a הפסד יותר מכדי חסרונן? (Bava Metzia 38a)

The gemara in Pesachim 13a equates the case of a פקדון of חמץ on Erev Pesach with a הפסד יותר מכדי חסרונן. The מ"א in סימן תמ"ג paskens that if the שומר doesn't sell the חמץ before Pesach he is חייב to pay the מפקיד for the damages. We see clearly from the מ"א that he holds that there is a חיוב to sell in a case of הפסד. On the other hand רעק"א in חושן משפט סי' רצ"ב points out that this point seems to be a מחלוקת the טור and the רמב"ן.

סימנים וסימנים ועד אחד (Bava Metzia 28a)

From the gemara here (28a) it seems that an עד א' does not work by אבידה as the gemara says that סימנים וסימנים ועד א' עד א' כמאן דליתיה. However, the Rishonim (Ran, Ritva and others) in Chullin (96a) say that an עד א' is believed by אבידה.

One answer given is based on the מרדכי in the frst perek as follows. סימנים is like 2 עדים. Therefore when you have סימנים וסימנים ועד א' it is like you have 2 עדים vs. 3 עדים, and we all know that 2 עדים are equal to 100 עדים and therefore that is why here the עד א' כמאן דליתיה, he is the equivalent of a 3rd עד.

חציו ולפנים של בעל הבית (Bava Metzia 26a)

What is the case? What does the בעל הבית say? The Rambam writes explicitly (גזילה ואבידה ט"ז הל' י"א-י"ב) that the בעל הבית gets it if he says that it his, however, if he says that it is a מציעה then finders keepers even if חציו ובפנים. Here is the language of the Rambam (which is quoted in Shulcahn Aruch Siman ר"ס)

יא [ט] מצא מטמון בכותל חדש--אם המטמון מוכיח שהוא לבעל הבית, הרי הוא שלו; ואם מוכיח שהוא לאחד מן השוק, הרי הוא של מוצאו. כיצד: הסכין, הרי הניצב שלו מוכיח; והכיס, פיו מוכיח. ואם נמצא תוך הכותל מלא מהן, חולקין.

יב [י] היו בתוך הכותל מעות או לשונות של זהב, שאין שם מוכיח--מחצייו ולחוץ, של מוצא; מחצייו ולפנים, של בעל הבית. [יא] וייראה לי שאין הדברים אמורים, אלא בשטען בעל הבית שהמטמון שלו, או שהיה יורש שאנו טוענין לו שמא של אביו הן; אבל אם הודה שהן מציאה, הרי הן של מוצאן.

This makes the case of where the object fills up the whole hole very difficult. In that case, the din is חולקים. It must be that the בעל הבית is claiming that it is his, otherwise for sure it would go the finder (after all even by חציו ובפנים the finder keeps it if the בעל הבית doesn't claim it as his). If so, why יחלוקו? The בעל הבית is saying it is mine, the finder is not challenging that claim, his claim that he found it should be irrelevant, he found the בעל הבית's object that was not lost. R' Akiva Eiger asks a similar question on the din on חולקים and leaves it וצ"ע.